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Inheritance: The Financial 
Link between Generations 
Paul L. Menchik 
There seems to have  been  a recent  revival of  scholarly  interest in the 
distribution of  privately held material wealth  and in the transmission  of 
wealth inequality  across generations.  Impressive  analytical and simula- 
tion models have been devised to study these issues and predict the out- 
comes of  various social policy changes.  (Blinder  1973, 1976a,  1976b; 
Oulton 1976; Atkinson 1971;  Stiglitz 1969; Smith, Franklin, and Orcutt 
1978). Empirical evidence, however, is necessary to provide the build- 
ing blocks of  simulation models, and to test the validity of  the predictions 
of  analytical models. In this field, as in so many other areas of the social 
sciences, empirical advances have unfortunately failed to keep pace with 
nonempirical developments. 
I examine two questions in this paper. First, a specific one: To what 
extent does the material inheritance received by the children of  wealthy 
parents “account”  for their own wealth?  Second,  a more general  one: 
What is the relationship between the lifetime resources  (both inheritance 
and earnings) of  individuals and the amount they fail to consume them- 
selves-that  is, the amount they leave to others-in  a life cycle sense?’ 
4.1  Does Material  Inheritance Matter? 
There is ample evidence that privately  held  wealth  is  more concen- 
trated than earnings in the United States. The pioneering work done by 
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Colin Harbury  (1962) showed  a strong positive  relationship,  at least 
for the U.K.,  between the wealth of  wealthy individuals and that of their 
parents. Though Harbury was not able to obtain information on the be- 
quests from specific parents to their children, the implication of  his study 
is that material inheritance does indeed transmit inequality across gen- 
erations. This paper relates inheritance and gifts received by a sample of 
children to their wealth at death, using probate record data. 
There has been previous empirical research into a question somewhat 
similar, though not identical, to the first question I have posed. In a sur- 
vey of 957 high-income people,  having an income of  $10,000 or more 
in  1964, Barlow et al. (1966) asked each individual if  he had received 
an inheritance. Three-fifths of  the group responded in the negative. After 
making assumptions about the growth of  the value of  assets, the authors 
concluded  that more than  four-fifths  of  the total  wealth  of  this  high- 
income group was derived from saving out of  income (not earnings), and 
less than one-fifth from inheritances and gifts plus their appreciation. 
In a Federal Reserve study by Projector and Weiss  (1966), respon- 
dents were asked what portion of  total assets was inherited. The choice of 
answers  was:  none,  small,  and  substantial.  The  percent  answering 
“none” falls as wealth class rises, and the percent answering “substantial” 
rises from  zero in the $1 to $999 wealth class to 34 percent in the $500,- 
000 and over wealth class in the cross-section.  The percent responding 
“substantial” was, overall, 5 percent, rising with age from 1 percent for 
those under 34 to 9 percent for those 65 and over. 
One problem with these surveys, if  the focus of  concern is intergen- 
erational transfers, is that they do not take account of  the effects of the 
death of  both parents. One would expect reported inherited wealth to be 
small as long as one’s parents were living. I shall present evidence on the 
ratio of  the real present value of  inheritance from parents and the real 
value of  wealth for individuals both of  whose parents are dead. 
4.1.1  The Relationship between  Lifetime Resources and Transfers 
The unknown relationship between lifetime resources and the amount 
transferred  to others is  quite important  in  inter  and  intragenerational 
models, and its character has important policy implications. 
Macroeconomic Theory and  Policy 
Does aggregate consumption vary with the degree of  income inequality 
in  an economy? Does the  marginal propensity to consume out of Zife- 
time resources vary with one’s resources? While it was first thought that 
equalizing the income distribution would increase consumption, the mod- 
els of Friedman  (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg ( 1954) indicate 
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siders the effect of  resource inequality  on consumption in  a  life  cycle 
framework. 
In Blinder’s model, the consumer chooses his time path of  consump- 
tion c(t) in order to maximize lifetime utility and is subject to the con- 
straint that the present  discounted value of  both consumption  and ter- 
minal wealth or bequests (if any) equals lifetime resources, W.  Formally, 
the budget constraint is 
j”;  c(t)e-rtdt +  KTecrt  =  W 
with r the rate of  interest, t the consumer’s age, KT  the bequest, and W 
the sum of  the present  value  of  earnings  and bequests received  (inter 
vivos gifts are treated as discounted bequests in the model). T is the cer- 
tain length of  life.2 A lifetime utility function, the isoelastic function, is 
specified. The isoelastic function has the following property:  when life- 
time resources increase, c(t) increases in the same proportion for all t. 
Yaari (1964) has demonstrated that if  this property is preserved and the 
consumption  plan does not dictate equal  consumption  at each instant, 
then the utility function must be isoelastic. The lifetime utility function 
is, 
where 6, p > 0 
and b 2 0 
and  p  is the subjective rate of  time preference  for consumption.  Strict 
proportionality between  consumption  and  resources  follows  from  this 
model if  one of  two parameter relations holds. If  b =  0, individuals de- 
rive  no utility  from bequests and  proportional  consumption  holds.3 If 
b > 0 but  6 =  p, proportionality  holds.  (This result  is  mentioned  by 
Modigliani and Ando [1957].) 
Blinder shows that if  b > 0 the lifetime marginal propensity to con- 
sume (MPC) is  less than unity; it  decreases with  W if  6 >  @  and in- 
creases with W if  p >  6. Hence, the notion that the lifetime MPC is con- 
stant over the income distribution is a special case  (when  6 =  p) of  a 
general model in  which the MPC can either rise or fall with  one’s re- 
sources:  the answer hinges on the relative magnitude of  p and  6. Fur- 
thermore, Blinder shows that the effect of  permanent inequality (though 
mean  preserving)  changes  in  the income  distribution  will  alter  aggre- 
gate consumption, and consequently aggregate saving, depending on the 
relative magnitude of  /3  and  6. A  reduction  in  inequality will  increase, 
leave unchanged, or decrease aggregate consumption according to wheth- 
er 6 is greater than, equal to, or less than p. Though the relative magni- 162  Paul L. Menchik 
tude of  p and 6 is unknown, the ratio 6/p  is approximately the resource 
elasticity of  bequests.  This  elasticity has  never  been  estimated;  in  this 
paper I  will  offer  an estimate  of  its magnitude,  using  data from  two 
sources. 
The relationship between lifetime resources and transfers is important 
in models of  income and wealth distribution. If  the elasticity of  transfers 
with respect to resources exceeds unity, higher income parents will leave 
a greater proportion of  their income to their children than lower income 
parents. Assuming that the correlation  between  parent  and child earn- 
ings is  not negati~e,~  this effect would be a force for greater inequality 
in wealth  and nonearned  income across generations. The disequalizing 
effect of nonproportional transfers is shown formally in the intergenera- 
tional  model  presented  by  Meade  (1964)  and  discussed  in  detail  in 
Atkinson and Harrison (1978, chap. 8). 
Pryor (1973) simulates the distribution of  income in a multigenera- 
tional context. He specifies an “intergenerational saving function” which 
relates  bequests  to lifetime  resources.  Two  forms of  the function  are 
used, one function assuming that the elasticity of  bequests with respect 
to resources is unity, the other that bequests are luxury goods, implying 
an elasticity in excess of  unity. His results show that the second function 
will  yield a substantially greater degree of  income  inequality  than  the 
first function. 
The magnitude of  the resource elasticity of  transfers has implications 
concerning aggregate factor shares and earnings inequality. If  the elas- 
ticity exceeds unity, a growing economy will experience a rising capital- 
output ratio, since the aggregate saving rate will  rise. If  the  aggregate 
elasticity of  substitution between  capital and labor is less than one, 1a- 
bor’s share in the national income will  increase over time. However,  if 
capital intensity increases, the degree of  inequality of  labor income may 
also increase. A model by Michael Sattinger  (1977) generates earnings 
inequality  as  an increasing function of  capital  intensity-a  result  that 
depends upon  capital-skill  complementarity.  If  Sattinger’s  analysis  is 
correct  (he presents  supporting  empirical  evidence),  the  distributive 
consequences of  a  resource  elasticity  in  excess  of  unity,  in  a growing 
economy, will be an increasing share of  national income to labor  and 
increasing inequality in the division of  that share among earners. 
Economic mobility across generations should be influenced by the re- 
lationship between  lifetime resources and transfers to children. If  econ- 
omic immobility is defined as the degree of  similarity in economic posi- 
tion  of  parents  and children,  mobility  would  be the lack  of  similarity 
across generations. Material inheritance affords parents  the opportunity 
to influence their children’s economic positions. Since higher wealth par- 
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than lower wealth parents, this bequest effect would reinforce the posi- 
tive  correlation  between  parent-child  earnings  (Sewell  and  Hauser, 
1975) and reduce intergenerational  economic mobility. 
The Burden of  a Consumption Tax 
The U.S. Treasury (1977) has recently been considering the imposi- 
tion of  a consumption tax to replace the income tax. An annual tax on‘ 
consumption, with a lifetime averaging scheme in which each year’s tax 
is  based on the average of  present and past years, is  tantamount  to a 
a lifetime consumption tax. If  transfers are an untaxed good, as I under- 
stand them to be in the proposal, the relationship between lifetime re- 
sources and transfers is critical in determining the burden of  the tax. If, 
for example, transfers  were  a luxury good having  a resource  elasticity 
in excess of  unity,  a proportional consumption  tax would be regressive 
with respect to lifetime economic resources. In fact, without knowledge 
of  the elasticity of  transfers with  respect  to total  resources, we  cannot 
say a priori what the rate schedule would have to be to ensure progres- 
sivity or even proportionality. 
Some Prior Expectations 
Though the elasticity of  transfers or of  bequests with  respect to life- 
time resources is still unknown,  some rather strong a priori  arguments 
have been made about its magnitude.  Gary Becker  (1974)  presents  a 
a model of  intergenerational transfers in which the elasticity of  bequests 
with respect to lifetime resources must exceed unity. His model assumes 
that family  heads act as if  they were maximizing  a utility  function  as 
composed of  the wealths  of  the present  and all  future generations  de- 
scending from the family head. An assumption of  homothetic preferences 
for all generations, present and future, is sufficient to guarantee that only 
a small fraction of  an increment in the head’s resources will be consumed 
by him, the rest going to his heirs. However, if  the head’s utility function 
is not homothetic with respect to the present and all future generations, 
and if  the head does not act as if  he is allocating his dynasty’s income 
but only his own, Becker’s conclusions need not follow. 
Taking quite a different tack, Lester Thurow’s  (1975) model implies 
conclusions  similar  to  Becker’s  concerning  the  resource  elasticity  of 
bequests.  In  Thurow’s  model,  individuals do not  hold  or  accumulate 
wealth  with  the  bequest  motive  or  an  interdependent  utility  function 
motive in mind. In fact, Thurow dismisses the latter reason, citing the 
“mysterious” fact that large wealthholders do not fully utilize the oppor- 
tunities  to transfer property by making gifts, which are subject to lower 
rates of  taxation  than are bequests. A possible explanation for this ap- 
parent mystery is that the transfer of  appreciated assets by gift is subject 164  Paul L. Menchik 
to capital gains taxation that uses original cost as the basis while trans- 
fer by bequest allows the basis to be stepped up to the value at death of 
the testator. 
In Thurow’s  formulation,  the motive  for  accumulating  and  holding 
wealth is economic power. Individuals enjoy the power that accrues from 
wealthholding until their death, at which time the wealth passes to heirs. 
since consumption of  market goods and services is subject to diminish- 
ing marginal utility, while power, he asserts,  is  not,  wealth  and conse- 
quently bequests will rise disproportionately with lifetime resources. 
However, the elasticity of  bequests with respect to lifetime resources 
will exceed unity under much weaker conditions than those invoked  by 
Thurow. Blinder (1974) points out that the bequest elasticity will exceed 
unity as long as the marginal utility of  consumption declines at a faster 
rate than the marginal utility of  bequests-a  condition  that I find quite 
reasonable. 
Some Problems in Estimation 
The absence of  knowledge about the relationship between lifetime re- 
sources and transfers in  general, or even bequests  alone, is  due to the 
lack of  appropriate data. As  Blinder  states (1976b, p.  92): “To date, 
lack of  either time series or cross-section  data on lifetime income  and 
bequests  has  precluded  direct measurement  of  the wealth  elasticity  of 
bequests. . . . it must be admitted that we know relatively little about the 
wealth elasticity of  bequests.” It should be pointed out that the data base 
required  to answer the questions posed  above would match individual 
earnings histories  and  inheritances received  with  actual  bequests,  not 
notional or planned bequests (unless plans are perfectly realized, an un- 
likely occurrence when the time and costs of  death are not known with 
certainty and capital markets are less than perfect). Furthermore, efforts 
to estimate the relationship between earnings histories and net worth held 
by  living individuals  as  reported  in  a survey might be quite imprecise 
because of  nonresponse and response error. There is evidence that high 
income and high wealth individuals are more likely not to respond than 
others  (Projector and Weiss  1966, p.  58; Ferber  1965, 1969). It has 
also been  found that response  bias  has  the effect of  overstating small 
asset holdings and understating large holdings.  (Ferber 1905, 1969). If 
these factors are operating, the bias would be predictable. The regres- 
sion  coefficient of  reported  earnings  on reported  net  worth  would  be 
biased downward if  the data base was not adjusted for nonresponse and 
response error.5 
4.2  Two Simple Models 
nonlinear form. Each will be described in turn. 
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4.2.1  The Linear Form 
such that, 
Let us say that net worth A  is a linear function of  “full wealth”  w, 
A =  a, +  alW+  E 
with  E  the stochastic error term. Full wealth, W,  is the sum of  two com- 
ponents:  the present  value  of  potential  lifetime  earnings, E, and  the 
present value of  inherited wealth, I. 
Since W =  E +  I, we get 
A =  a, +  a,E +  all +  E 
as the basic linear specification.6 Net worth in this paper is measured at 
a very specific point, death, when its magnitude is revealed in the probate 
records. Hence, we are analyzing a particular net asset holding function. 
It is the function relating full wealth-potential  earnings and inheritance 
-to  terminal wealth or bequests. The present value of  inter vivos trans- 
fers made and received should, of course, be included in both A  and 1. 
Gifts, to the extent that they were revealed in the probate records, were 
therefore included in my empirical work. 
It is important to note that potential  rather than actual earnings are 
specified in the model. Since potential earnings (average wage rate mul- 
tiplied by a “standard” number of  hours) are independent of  variations 
in leisure time consumed, this formulation  avoids  a possible  source of 
endogeneity between inheritance received and labor supply, and conse- 
quently actual earnings. 
In the primary data base used in this study only two of  the three var- 
iables are observable, A and I. Earnings (both potential and actual)  are 
unobservable. If  E and Z are positively correlated, that is, if  inheritors 
of  large amounts are able to earn more than inheritors of  small amounts, 
the estimate of  a, (as well as the intercept a,)  from the regression equa- 
tion is biased upward. There are many possible reasons to think earnings 
and inheritance  are positively  correlated:  more  schooling,  which  is  a 
result of  wealth and leads to high wage rates; genetic endowments that 
influence earnings (this hypothesis  is  controversial) ;  family background 
effects on tastes; and, quite simply, either  family  or “class”  nepotism. 
If  E  and I  are positively correlated, for whatever reason, the estimated 
coefficient a1 must be adjusted downward. The unbiased estimate, a,,  is 
related to the biased observed estimate, a,, by the equation 
COV(  E,I) 
In this paper,  I try  to correct for this  omitted  variable bias in two 
ways: first, by using occupational groupings as proxies for earnings, and 
second, by using extraneous information (data from another sample)  to 
estimate the covariance-variance ratio. 
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One definition of  a1  is the marginal propensity to bequeath. The elas- 
ticity of  the dependent variable with respect to the independent variables 
depends,  of  course,  on where  along the function  the elasticity is  eval- 
uated. Standard procedure is to evaluate the elasticity at the mean, since 
we know that the function goes through that point. Since we do not know 
mean full wealth in this sample, this specification cannot reveal the full 
wealth elasticity of  bequests. 
4.2.2  The Double Log Form 
follows : 
Let us now  assume that terminal wealth  is  related  to full wealth  as 
A =  eyoWr,eE 
where W =  E +  I, with E  the stochastic error term. We may decompose 
W to get 
Taking natural logs we get, 
lnA=yo+yllnZ+ylln  1+-  +E  (  3 
In this constant elasticity specification, yI is the full wealth elasticity of 
bequests. In this model the omitted variable is In  [(  1 +  E/I)]  and the 
unbiased estimate of  yl is related to the biased estimate by 
with 91  the unbiased and p,  the observed coefficient. One would expect a 
negative  correlation between  In  I  and In  [l +  (E/I)]  since the inheri- 
tance term appears in the numerator of  one variable and in the denomi- 
nator of  the other. Consequently, it is expected that to correct for the 
bias, the estimated coefficient yl would have to be adjusted upward in 
magnitude. Data from another  sample (as already  mentioned)  will  be 
used to correct for omitted variable bias. 
At this  stage it  is  appropriate  to  consider  the  implication  of  these 
alternative functional forms. The linear form assumes that given incre- 
ments  in full  wealth  evoke  constant  incremental  changes  in  bequests 
(and in  lifetime  consumption), without  regard  to the preincremental 
full wealth position. 
The double log form assumes constant  proportional  responses,  with 
the constant of  proportionality  being the parameter of  interest. The as- 
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more plausible  to  me  on a  priori  grounds.  Individuals  with  low  full 
wealth  are restricted  by  their  budget  constraint in  their  ability  to  be- 
queath; hence variations around the mean  would tend to be restricted. 
Higher full wealth individuals would be less constrained by their budget 
and the variation  in their bequests would tend to be higher.  This ques- 
tion is analogous to the issue of  error structure in cross-section  budget 
studies. Findings  by  Prais  and  Houthakker  (1955)  support  the  view 
that the error variance rises with income in the cross-section  studies of 
expenditure patterns. Furthermore, if  the interest rate used  to compute 
the value of  full wealth had an error component in it, we would expect 
the size of  the discrepancy between actual and predicted bequest to vary 
directly with  full wealth.  In the linear model, simple  additivity  of  the 
error term, combined with an assumption of  a constant error variance, 
would not yield a discrepancy that increases with full wealth. However, 
since the  error enters  the  double  log  specification  in  a  multiplicative 
fashion, discrepancies that increase in size with full wealth are allowed. 
In any case,  this  paper  uses  two statistical procedures  in  an effort  to 
determine which form is more appropriate. 
4.3  The Data 
The starting point for my study was a master file of  1,050 Connecticut 
residents who died in the 1930s and ’40s leaving estates of  $40,000 or 
more in current dollars-obviously  a very wealthy group.‘  In approxi- 
mately  half  the cases, obituary column  data was  also available.  There 
were 614 cases in which children were indicated by the death records. 
These 614 parents had  1,458 children, for an average of  2.37 children 
per family. 
The number of  children whose probate records were actively searched 
for was reduced to  1,182, for two reasons:  (a) in certain cases, names 
were illegible or were not given; (b) it was assumed that daughters who 
were unmarried at the time of  the parent’s death would eventually marry 
and  change names.  (I eventually searched  for some of  the unmarried 
daughters  and found a small subsample.) 
4.3.1  Bequests 
In order to find the probate records of  the children, I first searched 
the index of  deaths in the Connecticut Department of  Vital Records. If 
a name from my active list turned up, I checked the actual death certifi- 
cate, which  listed the name of  the child’s parents  (information  I  also 
had from the parent’s probate records)  and allowed me to make a posi- 
tive match between parent and child. I then tracked  down the estate of 
the children  in the probate  files, and using similar methods,  I tracked 
down the estate of  the spouse of  the parent in the original sample. Con- 168  Paul L. Menchik 
necticut does not have an annual index of  deaths before  1948, and I 10- 
cated only 191 cases in which both parents’ estates are known; I have 
used this subsample here. 
The 1,182 cases searched are accounted for as follows: 
Cases found  300 
Women listed by husband‘s first name and therefore 
lost to the sample  12 
Search error  (estimate)  100 
Individuals still alive  (estimate)  150-200 
Individuals who died out of  state (estimate)  570-620 
The estimate that 150-200  individuals  were alive in  1976 (the last 
year that was searched)  is based on the age distribution of  the children. 
The considerable search error came in making matches based on death 
data. In order to approximate the magnitude of  this error, I ran through 
my entire list of  1,182 at a designated probate district, and found a num- 
ber of  children in the probate  files that I had overlooked in the death 
index. The proportion of  my sample that fell within this district gave me 
an estimate of  100 cases lost by search error. 
If the heirs of  a child in my sample did not file because the child in my 
sample had no wealth or negative wealth, truncation of  the dependent 
variable might bias my results. According to Connecticut statutes, how- 
ever, records for estates of  any positive size must be filed, even if  only 
a small estates affidavit is made. The Connecticut Probate Administra- 
tion has recently begun to tabulate the number of  estates in which rec- 
ords are filed on a yearly basis. In 1975, the first year of  tabulation, they 
reported  19,939 cases filed. The total  number  of  deaths  of  adult Con- 
necticut residents in 1975 is  24,466; we thus can estimate a filing ratio 
of  81.5 percent (State of  Connecticut  1977). 
How likely is it that one of  the children in my sample fell in the bottom 
18.5 percent (those who did not file because there was no estate), after 
having been born to parents in roughly the upper 2 percent of the wealth 
distribution?  Projector  and Weiss  (1966)  report,  by  wealth  class,  the 
proportion  of  consumer  units  for whom  inherited  assets  constitute  a 
“substantial”  proportion  of  total  assets.  The bottom wealth  class  (less 
than  $1,000)  constitute  26 percent  of  the  consumer  units.  Since  my 
sample was drawn from inheritors, the inherited portion  of  total wealth 
for any low wealth  member  of  that sample should be  substantial. The 
number of  the group that reported the answer “substantial” is zero. This 
does not,  of  course, prove lack  of  truncation  bias, but  it does suggest 
that the problem is minimal in this particular sample. 
A potentially more serious problem is the lack of  data for those who 
moved out of  state. If  the movers earn more than the stayers, the mea- 
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danger of  bias is much less for the coefficient estimates, since the market 
for capital is a national market.) If  it is true that movers earn more than 
stayers,  the  measured  ratio  of  inheritance  to  terminal  wealth  will  be 
biased upward in this study. However, I do not think we can say on a 
priori  grounds  that  movers  will  earn more  than  stayers; we  can  only 
argue that those who move do so because they think their earnings op- 
portunities  will be greater  after moving than  they would  have  been  if 
they had chosen to stay.x Furthermore, the decision to move from an area 
can be expected to depend on prospects at both the destination and the 
origin. Connecticut is  the richest state in  per capita income in  the con- 
tinental United States.O Prosperous or soon-to-be-prosperous  people are 
more likely to move from relatively poor states, for instance, Mississippi, 
to wealthy areas. The mover/stayer  issue might,  therefore, cause biases 
in intergenerational studies centering on these states. Since Connecticut 
is a wealthy state the danger of  bias is not nearly so great as it would be 
for other states. 
An additional argument for assuming that the  mover-stayer  issue is 
not a problem in my sample is  that the people I studied tended  to own 
businesses or were corporate executives and successful professionals. In- 
dividuals operating their  parents’ businesses  would  tend  to be stayers. 
Corporate executives outside Connecticut are unlikely to be more  SUC- 
cessful than Connecticut corporate  executives,  given the agglomeration 
of  high corporate executives residing in Fairfield County. The same ar- 
gument  would  hold  for successful  professionals.  Wealthy  lawyers,  for 
instance, who work in the New York metropolitan area are likely to live 
outside it, and Connecticut has never had an income tax (New York has 
one). Finally,  the median estate for the  sixteen  out-of-state  decedents 
that I was able to find was  only  1  percent  higher  than  that  of  the in- 
state  decedents. 
4.3.2  Inter Vivos Transfers 
If a gift is made “in contemplation of  death,” it is treated as a bequest 
for Connecticut death tax purposes. However, whether or not a particu- 
lar gift is  made in  contemplation  of  death is  a matter for the probate 
authorities to decide,  and all  gifts are supposed  to be  revealed  to the 
authorities,  whether  they  will ultimately  be  considered  taxable  or not. 
I  incorporated the information on gifts revealed in  the probate records, 
using rates  of  return  discussed  below,  in  my  definitions  of  inheritance 
received and terminal wealth. 
4.3.3  Contingent Bequests 
When a testator bequeaths the life interest of  an asset to an heir, with 
the  asset  itself  passing  to a subsequent heir  (the remainderman) after 
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cated to the remainderman.  The present  value  is  calculated  using  the 
age and life expectancy of  the initial heir and an appropriate  discount 
rate (4% was used by the Connecticut authorities).  The difference be- 
tween the current value of  the asset and the present value of  the contin- 
gent interest is allocated to the life tenant. 
4.4  Empirical Results 
What is the proportion of  material wealth  attributable to inheritance 
among the people in this sample of  inheritors? A simple answer to this 
question, following in  the  tradition  of  the  two  previous  studies  cited, 
would be to compute the ratio  of  the present  value  of  inheritances  re- 
ceived to wealth held  when the data are revealed  to us,  i.e.,  upon  the 
death of  the inheritor. 
Inheritance  is  defined  in  this  paper  as  including  only  bequests  and 
gifts (as revealed in the probate records)  from both parents.  It excludes 
inheritances  received  from others  (grandparents,  spouse,  siblings,  and 
SO  on) and is, therefore,  a lower bound  estimate of  total  inheritances 
received by the child. We should use the present value,  at death, of  in- 
heritance received,  since a  dollar of  wealth  received  in the past  would 
potentially grow at the market rate of  return over time; its present value 
would,  therefore, indicate  its  current  command  over  resources.  If  the 
ratio of the present value of  inheritance received and terminal wealth is 
less than unity for an individual, we  can say that in  a  life cycle sense 
he was a net saver out of  his own earnings. Conversely, if  the ratio ex- 
ceeds unity, he was a net “depleter.” 
There are several possible complications in this approach. If  individ- 
ual net worth reaches a peak and then declines with age, the denominator 
of the ratio (net worth  at death) would be understated  relative  to the 
lifetime peak. Moreover, if  the rate of  return was positive in the period 
after the individual’s peak wealth  position, the ratio of  inheritance  and 
wealth would  tend to be overstated  (relative to the peak)  for both  of 
these reasons.  There is, however,  an increasing body of  evidence  that 
suggests that wealthholding rises monotonically with age, and that indi- 
viduals  die  at or near  their  lifetime  peak  (Mirer  1979; Smith  1975; 
Shorrocks 1975). Within my sample I found no significant effect of  age 
at death or age at death squared on  terminal wealth or the log of  ter- 
minal wealth. Since, as Shorrocks points out, a flat age-wealth relation 
in the cross-section  implies an increasing individual profile over time  if 
real productivity is growing, these data imply that wealth is at a lifetime 
peak at death. 
Another possible complication would occur if  there were changes over 
time in the share of  full wealth  that parents expend on human  capital 
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sample purchased  only a high school education for the children, while 
the children purchased  a  college education for their  own  children.  In 
such a case, children who were identical to their parents in every respect, 
except for a difference in  the composition  (not total amount)  of  their 
inte’rgenerational transfer, would more likely be classified as “depleters” 
than their parents, since human-capital-augmenting expenditures are not‘ 
measured in this study. 
The real value  (in  1967 dollars)  of  the terminal wealth  of  the  191 
children in my sample is  highly skewed, with  a mean  of  $1,086,000, a 
median  of  $156,520, and  a  standard  deviation  of  $3,811,848.10 The 
value of  inheritance received  from parents  in  real  (not present-value) 
units has a mean of  $205,077, a median of  $57,846, and a standard de- 
viation of  $386,098. The ratio of  real inheritance received and terminal 
wealth for each child is distributed as follows: 
Percentile 
5th  .030 
25th  .125 
50th (median)  .293 
75th  .810 
95th  7.548 
These ratios, generally less than unity, indicate the proportion of  terminal 
wealth  attributed  to inheritance only from parents  in a world  in  which 
the real  rate of  return  is  zero.  Using this method,  we  see that at the 
median the ratio of  inheritance to terminal wealth is approximately  .30, 
implying that inheritance accounts for 30 percent of  terminal wealth. A 
more realistic technique is to compute these ratios with positive real rates 
of  return. 
In order to compute present  values it is  necessary  to choose appro- 
priate  measures of  the market  rate of  return,  i.e.,  that  rate  at which 
wealth would grow from the time the bequest  was  received to the time 
of  death of  the child.  I used four different  rates:  an interest  rate  (the 
rate on prime commercial 4-6  months paper)  ,11 and three stock market 
rates.  The stock market  rates  were  constructed  from  the  Fisher  and 
Lorie (1  977) stock index, using three alternative tax  treatments of the 
dividends yielded.12 (Since I want the total rate of  return I use the rates 
that assume all dividends are reinvested.) The first assumption is that no 
tax was paid, the second that tax was paid  at a medium  rate (the rate 
on an individual with taxable income of  $10,000 in 1960), and the third 
that tax was paid at a high rate (the rate at the $50,000 level in  1960). 
The interest rate on prime commercial 4-6  months paper  kept only 
slightly ahead of  inflation. Over the period  1926 to 1960, for example, 
an asset  growing  at this  interest  rate  would  have  increased  in  market 
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cent. The value of  stocks using the high tax rate index grew 1,737 per- 
cent  between  1926 and  1960, and the  growth rates  of  the  other  two 
series were even greater. We may thus think of  the interest rate return 
as a conservative return that only modestly  augments the real value  of 
the portfolio. 
Table 4.1 presents the size distribution  of  the ratio of  present value 
of  inheritance received  and  terminal  wealth,  using four asset  price  in- 
dexes. There is substantial variation in the ratio for each index used. The 
interest  rate index implies that at the median,  about 50 percent of  the 
child’s terminal wealth can be attributed  to parental inheritance. If  this 
index is the appropriate rate of  return, we  can say that most of  the chil- 
dren were net savers out of  own  earnings.  The results  using the three 
stock price indexes are quite different. Index 2, for example, assumes a 
value of  4.40 at the median. This implies that the median child not only 
consumed  all his own earnings, but most  of  the yield  from his inheri- 
tance  (dividends as well as capital appreciation), and still left an estate 
more than three times that left to him by his parents, in constant dollars 
(since the median ratio of the real value of  inheritance to terminal wealth 
is about .3). Let me add as qualifications,  that the stock price indexes 
do not take capital gains taxation into account and that the typical port- 
folio may  have  included less  productive  but perhaps  less  risky  assets 
than shares on the New York Stock Exchange. In any case, the results 
in column  1 indicate that if  the median child‘s inheritance grew only as 
fast as the interest rate index, parental inheritance alone would amount 
to one-half  of  the child’s terminal wealth.  If  higher rates  of  return  are 
used, parental inheritance would amount to a much greater share of  ter- 
minal wealth and, in fact, exceed unity. 
4.4.1 
In this section regression results relating terminal wealth to inheritance 
received are presented. Recall that these estimates are biased due to the 
The Demand to Bequeath:  Uncorrected Estimates 
Table 4.1  Ratio of  Real  Present Value of Inheritance Received from 
Parents and Real  Terminal Wealth 
Asset Price Indexes 
Distribution  Index 1  Index 2  Index 3  Index 4 
(percentile)  Interest Rate  Stocks-High  Tax  Stocks-Med.  Tax  Stocks-No  Tax 
S  .os  .36  .42  .46 
2s  .25  1.40  1.74  2.01 
50  .5 1  4.40  6.15  7.86 
75  1.48  12.50  16.50  21.30 
95  11.26  154.00  180.00  260.00 173  The Importance of  Material Inheritance 
omission of lifetime earnings from the regression. First, the results from 
the linear model  are presented,  then  the double log results. 
The dependent variable in these regression  equations is the value of 
terminal wealth  (in constant  1967 dollars)  of  the  children. If  a  child 
made a gift, its value is added to terminal  wealth  after it has been  in- 
flated with one of  the four indexes mentioned  above. Four versions of 
the major independent variable, present value  (also in  1967 dollars) of 
inheritance received from mother and father, were constructed using the 
four indexes. The bivariate regression results appear in table 4.2. As can 
be seen, the coefficient estimates are quite sensitive  to  the  asset price 
index used. 
The wide range in coefficient estimates is  a consequence of  the scal- 
ing of  the independent  variable. The higher the rate of  return  used the 
greater the real present value of  the inheritance received, and the lower 
the value of  its coefficient estimate. In a case like this,  the E2 tells  US 
something about the appropriate results  to rely  upon. The independent 
variable is  constructed from three components, nominal inheritance re- 
ceived, the time between  the child’s death and that of  his parents,  and 
the rate of  return. Only the third  factor varies  across regressions,  and 
the R2 tells us that the first index provides the least information in ex- 
plaining the variation of the dependent variable. The @’  for the last three 
regressions implies that for this group nearly 60 percent of  the variation 
in terminal wealth is explained by variation in inheritance received. 
In table 4.3 the loglinear  regression results are presented; they indi- 
cate that the uncorrected full wealth elasticities cluster between  .32 and 
.38. 
Table 4.2  Regression Results: Real Terminal Wealth (RWLTH) as a 
Linear Function of  Real Present Value of  Inheritance 
Received (RPVNHER) 
Independent Variable 
Dependent  RPVNHER RPVNHER  RPVNHER  RPVNHER 
Variable  #1  #2  #3  #4  Constant  R2 
RWLTH #1  2.801  -74,234.6  ,358 





,1253  95,800.1  591 
(16.6) 
.0939  120,828.5  .S82 
(16.3) 
Noie: “t” ratio in parentheses;  n = 191. 174  Paul L. Menchik 
Table 4.3  Regression Results: Log of  Terminal Wealth (LWLTH) on 
Log of  Inheritance (LPVNHER) 
Independent Variable 
Dependent  LPVNHER  LPVNHER  LPVNHER  LPVNHER 
Variable  #I  #2  #3  #4  Constant  i@ 
LWLTH  #1  .3833  7.642  .185 
LWLTH #2  .3388  7.502  .215 
LWLTH #3  .3346  7.466  .219 





Note:  “i”  ratio in parentheses,  n = 191. 
Additional explanatory  variables were added to the regression equa- 
tions. SEX is  a dummy variable  assuming a  value  of  unity  for males, 
zero for females. Three marital status dummies were added, MAR, WI- 
DOW, and NEV MAR. These assume a value of  unity if  the subject was 
married  (at time of  death), widowed, or never  married.  Divorced per- 
sons constitute the excluded basis. SIBSHIP is the number of  the child’s 
siblings plus one. Birth cohort dummies were added to the regression to 
link the subject’s wealth accumulation behavior to history, since people 
born  at different  times  faced  different  economic  environments  during 
their  lives. BC1, BC2, BC3, BC4, and BC5 assume values  of  unity if 
the subject was born before  1876, from  1876 to  1885, from  1886 to 
1895, from 1896 to 1905, and from 1906 to 1915 respectively. The ex- 
cluded basis  consists of  those born  after  1915. UBC consists  of  those 
whose  birth  cohort could  not  be  determined  with  the  available  data 
(there are eight such cases). Occupational dummies were added as well: 
OCC, has a value of  unity for those owning a business; OCC,  for busi- 
ness executives, OCC3 for those engaged in domestic duties, OCCs for 
those  whose  occupations could  not  be determined  from  the  available 
data, OCC, for those who were independent professionals.  (OCC4, the 
excluded basis, assumes a value of  unity for those in all other occupa- 
tions.)  The regression results  are presented in tables 4.4 and 4.5. This 
battery of  demographic and occupational variables  adds little in  terms 
of  E2  or statistical significance (with the possible exception of  OCC, in 
table 4.5, implying that business owners save at higher rates  than oth- 
ers).I3 Inclusion of  these variables  has a negligible effect on the coeffi- 
cient estimates of  the inheritance variable. I also experimented with addi- 
tional variables: age (at death), age squared, and the number of  children 
of  the inheriting child. These added nothing  in terms of  statistical sig- Table 4.4  Regression Results: Effect of  Explanatory Variables on Terminal Wealth 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
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(.305)  190.9 
(.556)  463.2 
(-.419)  -405.7 
(-.173)  -194.3 
(.194)  16.6 
(.051)  210.9 
(-.154)  -214.4 
( -  .202)  -345.3 
(.005)  30.0 
(.394)  719.6 
(-1.07)  -  1,471.3 
(.744)  467.5 
(--.283)  -226.3 
(--.120)  72.4 
(.051)  63.4 
(.980)  851.1 























































Nore: ‘‘t’  ratio in parentheses. Table 4.5  Regression Results: Effect of  Explanatory Variables on Log of  Terminal Wealth 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
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(--.635)  -.285 
(.579)  .363 
(.303)  .198 
(.199)  .lo8 
(-1.34)  -.114 
(-1.04)  -  1.47 
(-,926)  -  1.26 
(-,983)  -1.38 
(-1.22)  -  1.70 
(- .684)  -1.01 
(S22)  .43 1 
(2.10)  .968 
( 1.04)  ,563 
(-.298)  -.168 
(.776)  .439 
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nificance, did not increase z2,  and did not alter the coefficient of  inher- 
itance or log of  inheritance received.14 
4.4.2 
I used  information from  another  data base,  that  in  Morgan  et  al. 
(  1962), to estimate the covariance/variance  ratio between the excluded 
and included variables. This survey asked if  the respondent received an 
inheritance. If  the answer was yes, it asked how much, and when. There 
were also questions about earnings and hours worked. I used a subsam- 
ple of  respondents aged 55 to 64. Since my  interest was in matching re- 
sults from my sample with those having the same attributes in the Mor- 
gan study, I used only those 124 families reporting that they had received 
positive inheritances. Annual earnings were divided by annual hours to 
generate  wage  rates.  Positive  wage  rates  were  assigned  to those  with 
zero wages  (both husband and wife),  using  a potential  earnings code 
based on age, sex, and education. Since the year of  inheritance was re- 
ported, I was able to calculate the present value of  inheritance received, 
assuming a  5 percent discount rate. The observed correlation  between 
wage and inheritance received for this group of  inheritors was positive, 
.17. 
To estimate a value for E, potential lifetime earnings, I used the life- 
time age-earnings  profile presented  by Mincer  (  1974), and discounted 
lifetime earnings to age 59.5 at a 5 percent rate. I  assumed a working 
life beginning at 18 years of  age and ending at 65. The correction factor 
in the linear model is the covariance of  E and I, divided by the variance 
of I, plus one. The estimated covariance/variance  ratio came to  1.139, 
implying  a correction  factor of  2.139.  Hence,  the unbiased  coefficient 
estimates of  inheritance on terminal  wealth  are less than  one-half  the 
biased  estimates.  The  unbiased  coefficient  estimate,  u1 in  the  linear 
model  (using the results from table 4.1 ) , is  1.3  1 when the interest rate 
of  return  is  used.  When  the  stock  price  indexes are used  to  compute 
present  value  of  inheritance  received,  the  a1  estimates  are  .087,  .059, 
and .044 for the high tax, medium tax,  and low tax rates of return  re- 
spectively. If  we select the rates of  return  that maximize the proportion 
of explained to total variance of  the dependent variable in the regression 
equations, the coefficients that we obtained when using the  stock price 
rates are chosen. The coefficient .087, corresponding to the high tax rate 
index, is  consequently the most preferred estimate of  the marginal pro- 
pensity to bequeath out of  full wealth when the model is  constrained to 
be linear. 
I found the correlation between the omitted and excluded variables in 
the loglinear model-recall  that these were In  I  and In [(  1 +  E/I)]- 
to  be  sharply negative:  -.883.  The covariance  was  -2.225  and  the 
variance  of  In  I, 2.586. Hence,  the  covariance/variance  ratio  is  com- 
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puted to be -.86.  The correction factor is therefore .14, implying that 
the true full wealth  elasticity is  more than seven  times  the biased  esti- 
mates obtained in the loglinear models. The unbiased elasticity estimates 
yl, using the interest and stock price rates of  return, were computed to 
be  2.75,  2.42,  2.40,  and  2.36  respectively.  Hence,  regardless  of  the 
choice of  discount rate, the estimates of  the elasticity of  bequests are in 
the elastic range when the double log form is used. 
4.4.3  Determination of  Functional Form 
Maximum  likelihood methods  have  been  devised  by  Box  and  COX 
(1964)  for choosing among alternative function  forms. Heckman  and 
Polachek  (1974) have utilized this technique to choose among alterna- 
tive forms of  the earnings/schooling  relationship.15 Using a transforma- 
tion of  the sum of  squared residuals, I selected the double log form over 
its  alternative,  the linear  specification. As  an additional  test, the para- 
metric test developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) was used to select 
between the linear and double log form. Applying this procedure,  1 find 
that the linear specification  fails to yield  homoscedastic  residuals.  The 
residuals from the double log form do indeed exhibit homoscedasticity. 
Thus,  the  assumption  of  constant  proportional  effects  assumed  in  the 
double log form is supported by these two tests. 
4.4.4  Computing Confidence Intervals 
As I mentioned in section  4.1,  the magnitude of  the elasticity of  be- 
quests with respect to lifetime resources has theoretical  and policy im- 
plications. It is most important to know if  this elasticity exceeds unity. On 
the basis of  the Goldfeld-Quandt test, it was determined that the disturb- 
ances in the double log model are homoscedastic and that therefore the 
estimated variance of  +1, the full wealth  elasticity, is unbiased.  Conse- 
quently we can construct confidence intervals around Tl, and test hypoth- 
eses using standard procedure. 
The unbiased estimate of  the full wealth elasticity is a function of  two 
components, the biased estimate of  yl  and the correction factor (call this 
factor p).  Hence  =  f(yl, p).  Using the Taylor expansion for  f  the 
variance of  q1  can be approximated as 
The covariance term is zero since the estimates were taken from  inde- 
pendent samples. In this case f(71,  p) =  p1/P2, so  (df/a71>* =  l/P2  and 
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Using  the  estimated  variances,  the standard errors of  are easily 
computed and are presented in table 4.6. Given the size of  the standard 
errors we can reject the null hypothesis that our elasticity is unity at the 
.025 level for each of  the four estimates. These data support the hypoth- 
esis that bequests are luxury goods. 
4.4.5  Are the Results Believable? 
Though 2.5 may at first seem like a high elasticity of  bequests with re- 
spect to lifetime resources, it is plausible if  we keep the Engels aggrega- 
tion  property  in mind.  This property  states  that,  for  a  consumer,  the 
weighted  sum of  income  elasticities  for  each  good  is  unity,  with  the 
weights being the share of  one’s budget expended on each good. In the 
lifetime context of  my model there are two goods, lifetime consumption 
and bequests, and lifetime resources (full wealth)  constitute the income 
measure.  Hence, 
apEG +  ~tnEn  =  1 
with Ec and ER  the elasticities of  lifetime consumption and bequests with 
respect to lifetime resources, and aC and an the respective budget shares. 
Since, for the  overwhelming  majority  of  people,  bequests  constitute  a 
small portion of  lifetime resources, ac would tend to dominate aII in mag- 
nitude; hence the weighted sum of  Ec and En would be unity even with 
seemingly high values of  Ell.  For example, if  as estimated in this paper 




Though an estimate of  the elasticity of  consumption with respect to life- 
time resources has not appeared in the literature, a measure that is con- 
ceptually very similar to  it has  been  estimated:  the permanent  income 
elasticity  of  consumption.  Permanent  income has  been  defined  as  the 
perpetual flow yield of  an asset equal in value to lifetime resources. Since 
the annual yields of  perpetual  and life annuities of  equal present value 
Table 4.6  Estimates of  the Full Wealth Elasticity of 
Bequests 
Asset Price Index  Unbiased Elasticity  Standard Error 
Interest rate  2.75 
Stock price 
high tax  2.42 
Stock price 
medium tax  2.40 
Stock price 
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are quite similar, the permanent and lifetime income elasticities of con- 
sumption should be quite similar.IG  Estimated permanent income elastici- 
ties of  consumption fall in the range of  .85 to .95.17  Using the above re- 
lationship, elasticities of  .85, .90, and  .95 predict lifetime consumption 
budget shares of  .9090, .9375, and .9677 respectively. Hence my bequest 
elasticity of  2.5 is  quite consistent with existing estimates of  the perma- 
nent income  elasticities  of  consumption  as  long  as  budget  shares  for 
bequests  are less than  10 percent-a  requirement  that is plausible  for 
the overwhelming majority of  consumers. 
4.5  Conclusion 
This paper estimates the ratio of  inherited to total wealth at death for 
a sample of  children of  wealthy parents.  This ratio is quite sensitive to 
the choice of  discount rate used. If  the interest rate or prime commer- 
cial paper 4-6 months is used, the median ratio is  .5. If  the rate of re- 
turn on stocks is used, the ratio is substantially greater, exceeding unity. 
Two models, a linear and a double log model, were estimated for the 
relationship of  net worth at death to “full wealth,” the sum of  potential 
lifetime  earnings  and  inheritance received  (both expressed  in  present 
value units). Statistical methods determined that the double log model 
was more appropriate to this set of  data. The implication of  this func- 
tional form is that lifetime saving is generated by constant proportional, 
not absolute,  responses. Since the constant of  proportionality,  the  full 
wealth elasticity, clusters around 2.5 we can say that a 1 percent increase 
in full wealth will result in a 2.5 percent increase in lifetime saving. Con- 
sequently a more egalitarian state will have a lower savings rate (in a life 
cycle sense) than  a less egalitarian state, other  things being  the same. 
One must, however, be careful about concluding that a consequence of 
equalizing income redistribution will necessarily be to reduce the rate of 
total capital formation. If  income is  redistributed in ways that augment 
people’s productive  abilities,  the  rate of  increase of  total capital,  both 
physical and human, need not be diminished. For example, if as a conse- 
quence of  income inequality children born to low income parents are less 
likely to achieve their earning potential than other children, then income 
redistribution in cash or in kind may augment human capital, and offset 
the reduction in the growth of  nonhuman capital.’* 
There is  a further  reason  for caution  in  concluding  that  an  equity- 
capital formation tradeoff exists. Equalizing the income distribution need 
not reduce macro capital formation if other policy adjustments are made 
as well. Use of monetary or fiscal policy, i.e., increased government sav- 
ing or expanded  use of  investment incentives,  can  prevent  the  rate  of 
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If  it is true that the elasticity of  bequests with respect to life resources 
is  2.5, the lifetime  marginal  and  average propensities  to consume fall 
with  life income  in  the cross-section; this  implies  that  a  lifetime  con- 
sumption tax having a proportional rate structure will be regressive with 
respect to life resources. Furthermore, as long as the intercorrelation be- 
tween the earnings of  parents and children is positive, intergenerational 
transfers will reduce economic equality within a generation  and reduce 
economic mobility across generations. 
Closing on a note of  caution, I must add that the parameter estimates 
presented in this paper depend on the correction factors used, correction 
factors that used  only one year of  earnings information to construct  a 
lifetime earnings estimate. To obtain results resting on firmer ground we 
need new data sources that link multiyear earnings histories  with either 
inheritance received, terminal wealth, or both. 
Impressive  analytical  and  simulation  models  have  been  devised  to 
study the distribution of  wealth and the intergenerational transmission of 
wealth inequality. It is now up to empirical research to keep pace with 
these impressive advances. 
Notes 
1.  John Brittain  (1978) is attempting  to answer  a question  similar to the first 
question, using an indirect approach. 
2. Levhari  and Mirman (1977) have analyzed the saving-consumption dzcision 
when  length of  life  is uncertain.  Uncertainty can either  increase or  decrease life- 
time consumption; the net effect is not known a priori. 
3.  If  b =  0,  people  would  not  bother  to  change  wills  as  a  consequence  of 
changes in death taxation in which the level of death taxation varies with the form 
of  estate devolution. In fact, one could argue that if  b =  0, people would not write 
wills at all since the legal fees associated with will writing can be a costly expendi- 
ture diverting resources  from consumption. 
4. In fact, evidence  presented  by  Sewell and Hauser  (1975) reveals  a positive 
correlation  of  about .2 between the earnings of  parent  and child. This would  tend 
to strengthen the disequalizing effect of transfers that proportionately  increase with 
increasing resources. 
5. An example of  an unadjusted data base is the Retirement  History Survey of 
the  Social Security Administration  (Ireland et  al.  1976). 
6.  Present values are calculated to the point in time when A  is measured. 
7. I am indebted  to William  McKinstry  for making this data base available  to 
me. 
8. To check the probable  magnitude of  this problem,  we  estimated  the  ratio of 
the earnings of  Wisconsin  high  school graduates who  moved  out of  state to  the 
earnings of  the stayers,  17  years after graduation.  It revealed that movers  earned 
26 percent more than stayers. However, for those whose parents  were  in  the  top 
10 percent of  the income distribution,  the ratio was only 9.6 percent,  which  sug- 182  Paul L. Menchik 
gests that  the  differential  falls  as  we  move  up the parental  income  distribution. 
This tabulation  was done for me  by  Robert  Hauser  using  the  Sewell and Hauser 
( 1975 )  sample. 
9.  In fact, it could be  argued  that mover/stayer bias could run in the  opposite 
direction,  if  lower  earners move  to less  expensive  or affluent areas outside Con- 
necticut. 
10. The price deflator used is the Consumer Price Index compiled by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
11. The annual index was computed  using  the series presented  in the US. Bu- 
reau of  the Census (1975) and updated in the annual series, Statistical Abstract of 
the United Srates. 
12.  Fisher and Lorie’s rates  of  return are based  on  the behavior  of  all  stocks 
listed  on  the New  York Stock Exchange  and constitute  the most  comprehensive 
stock index ever constructed.  I constructed  an  asset  price  time  series  from their 
annual rates. Since their annual rates include only one digit past the decimal, the 
cumulative effects of  rounding  can be substantial. The procedure inflates the value 
of  an inheritance received at a time  to, N, ,  to a value at time  T, PV,,  in the fol- 
lowing way:  0 
5  =  (1 +  rJ  with  r, the rate of  return in year  i 
N,  z  t 
0 
For the rates used see Fisher and Lorie  (1977, pp. 24-25,  28-29,  and 32-33). 
13. I was suprised that WIDOW, a dummy assuming a value of unity if  the per- 
son was a widow or widower, was not positive and significant. Since I do not have 
the  interspousal  transfers  of  children  in  the  data base,  I though  that  surviving 
spouses, having  an opportunity to inherit  from  their  mates,  would  possess more 
terminal wealth than others in the sample. 
14.  Could  it be  that for this  group, only inheritance matters? 
15. Discussions  of  this technique  are presented  in  econometrics  textbooks  by 
Zarembka  (1974) and Rao and Miller  (1971). 
16: For example, with  a 10 percent  interest rate the  annual yield of  a  50-year 
annuity is less than 1 percent  greater per annum than the yield of  a perpetual an- 
nuity of equal present value. 
17.  See Mayer  ( 1972) for income elasticities estimated by Friedman and others. 
18. Examples of  such policies would  include expenditures on health and educa- 
tion as well as general redistributive policies that strengthen  (not weaken) the fam- 
ily and provide work incentives and opportunities. 
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